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To  encourage employees not covered by private pension plans to save 
for retirement, individual retirement accounts (IRAs) were established 
in  1974 as part  of  the  Employee  Retirement  Income  Security  Act 
(ERISA). Emphasizing the need  to enhance economic well-being of 
future retirees and the need to increase national saving, the Economic 
Recovery  Tax  Act  of  1981 extended  the  availability of  IRAs  to all 
employees and raised the contribution limit. Now (1985) any employee 
with earnings in excess of $2000 can contribute up to $2000 to an IRA 
account each year, with tax deferred on the principle and interest until 
money is withdrawn from the account. The combined contribution of 
an employee and a nonworking  spouse can be  as high as $2250.  A 
married couple who are both working can contribute $2000 each. A 
proposed change in the law contemplates raising the individual IRA 
limit to $2500 and the (nonworking) spousal IRA limit from $2250 to 
$2500. 
Tax-deferred saving is potentially an important component of saving 
for retirement and could represent a very substantial increase in tax- 
free saving for many  employees.  Indeed, a $2000 contribution  to a 
retirement  account represents  a future pension  benefit greater than 
many employer-provided private pension plans. The availability of IRAs 
may also have a substantial effect on national saving. According to IRS 
data, total IRA contributions in 1982 were over $29 billion. 
Steven F.  Venti is an assistant professor of economics at Dartmouth College and a 
faculty research fellow of the National  Bureau of Economic Research. David A. Wise 
is the John F.  Stambaugh Professor of Political Economy at the John F.  Kennedy School 
of Government, Harvard University, and a research associate of the National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
The final version of this paper has benefited from the comments of Gary Burtless. 
The research was funded in part by  the Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS)  grant #67A-83  and in part by HHS grant #84ASPE130A 
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Despite the program’s  size and potential  significance,  surprisingly 
little is known about the determinants of IRA contributions. Thus the 
goals of this paper are: (1) to analyze the effect of individual attributes 
on whether a person contributes to IRAs, (2) to determine the effect 
of individual attributes on how much is contributed, and (3)  to simulate 
the effect of potential  changes in  contribution limits on the amount 
contributed to IRAs. The results can be used to  judge whether the goals 
that justified  introducing the program are being realized. Obviously, 
persons who do not contribute to IRA accounts will not benefit from 
them. With national concern about the federal deficit, the short-run 
tax cost of the program is of substantial interest. The simulations sug- 
gest what this cost is and what the cost of proposed changes in the 
program would be. A fourth issue, the effect of tax-deferred saving on 
net individual saving, is not addressed in this paper but will be analyzed 
in future work. 
This analysis is based on data obtained through a special supplement 
of the May 1983 Current Population Survey (CPS). Subsequent analysis 
will be based on the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances and a special 
Carnegie Commission Survey of college and university employees. 
Descriptive statistics on contributions to IRA accounts are presented 
in section  1.1. The statistical model used in the analysis is described 
in section 1.2. The results are presented in section 1.3, and in section 
1.4, results of a similar analysis based on Canadian data (Wise 1985) 
are compared with results for the United  States. The Registered Re- 
tirement Savings Plan (RRSP) in Canada is a tax-deferred program that 
incorporates the characteristics of both IRA and Keogh-like plans in 
the United States, although the contribution limits are quite different 
in the two countries. The same statistical model has been estimated 
on data from both countries. 
The major empirical findings may be summarized briefly: tax-deferred 
saving plans are unlikely to be used by low-income persons. Thus they 
do not  in general  substitute for private pension plans, since higher- 
income persons are more likely than those with lower incomes to be 
covered by private plans. Given income and other individual charac- 
teristics, persons with  private  pension plans  are no less likely  than 
those without  such plans  to contribute to an IRA. The findings for 
Canada are very similar to those for the United States. Since the con- 
tribution limits are very different, the similar findings support the sta- 
tistical specification. 
Simulations based on the parameter estimates for the United States 
indicate that if the limits were increased in accordance with the recently 
proposed Treasury Department changes to the tax system, contribu- 
tions would increase by about 30 percent. 11  The Determinants of IRA Contributions and the Effect of Limit Changes 
1.1  Descriptive Statistics 
Since model parameter estimates for the United States will ultimately 
be compared with  those for Canada, descriptive statistics for both 
countries are presented in this section. For several reasons the data 
for the two countries are not strictly comparable, but they allow rough 
comparisons. 
Most  contributions are  made  by  middle-income  employees. Al- 
though  nearly  32 percent of employed persons in  the United  States 
have incomes below $10,000, this group is responsible for only about 
10 percent of total  IRA contributions. Approximately  80 percent of 
contributions are made by persons with incomes between $10,000 and 
$50,000. Persons with incomes greater than  $50,000 contribute only 
about 10  percent of total contributions. In Canada, about 82 percent 
of contributions are made by individuals with incomes between $10,000 
and  $50,000, and  about  15 percent by  persons with  incomes above 
$50,000.  Only  3  percent  of  contributions are made  by  those  with 
incomes below $lO,OOO,  compared with 10 percent in the United States 
(see table 1.1). 
As shown in table 1.2, only 5 percent of persons with incomes less 
than $10,000 made an IRA contribution in  1982 in  the United States, 
and only about 2 percent in Canada. The proportions of higher-income 
groups making contributions are similar in the United States and Can- 
ada, although in general the proportions are lower in the United States 
than in Canada. Whereas the IRA program is new for most people in 
the United States, the Canadian RRSP plan was started in 1957. 
Only 11 percent of all contributors in the United States have incomes 
less than $lO,OOO,  80 percent have incomes between $10,000 and $50,000, 
and  about 9 percent have incomes greater than $50,000. Again,  the 
percentages in Canada are very similar to those in the United States. 
Over 6 percent of contributors have incomes less than $10,000, about 
87.5 percent have incomes between $10,000 and $50,000, and 7 percent 
have incomes greater than $50,000. 
Proportions of individuals that contribute to the contribution limits 
in the two countries are shown in table  1.3. Because the contribution 
limits vary substantially between the two countries, the numbers must 
be viewed accordingly.'  In neither country does the proportion con- 
tributing to the limit in any income group exceed 60 percent. In  addition, 
women are apparently more likely than men to contribute to the limit 
in  the United  States, whereas in  Canada the difference seems less 
apparent, although at least for persons with incomes below $50,000 the 
proportion for women is greater than for men, with the exception of 
the $0-$10,000  income group. 12  Steven F.  VentVDavid A. Wise 
Table 1.1  Percent Distribution of Individuals and of Contributions, by 
Income Interval" 
United States  Canada 
Percent of 
Income  Employed  Percent of IRA  Percent of  Percent of RRSP 


































































=The  Canadian data pertain to 1980 and the U.S. data to 1982. Tabulations for the United 
States are in U.S. dollars and those for Canada in Canadian dollars. Data for the United 
States are from the May 1983 CPS and supplemental Survey of  Pension and Retirement 
Plan Coverage. The data are weighted to represent the employed population,  ages 18- 
65, excluding the self-employed. The Canadian data are based on a random sample of 
tax filers and are weighted  to represent all tax filers. 
CCalculations are based  on midpoints of reported  IRA contribution intervals (see ap- 
pendix B). 
thousands. 
Average contributions in the United States range from $75 for the 
lowest  income group to  $1 116 for those  with  incomes greater than 
$70,000; while the average contribution of  contributors ranges from 
$1517 to $1883 (see table  1.4).  This suggests that among those who 
contribute, a large proportion in each income group contributes at the 
limit. Unreported tabulations indicate that at very high income levels 
85-90  percent of all contributions are at the limit. The percentage of 
employees with contributions at the limit ranges from about 3 percent 
for low-income to about 50 percent for high-income employees. The 
figures for Canada are comparable, but the average contribution levels 
are considerably higher, reflecting the higher limits. In addition, the 
Canadian data pertain to both employees and self-employed persons, l3  The Determinants of IRA Contributions and the Effect of Limit Changes 
Table 1.2  Percent with Contributions Greater than Zero  and Percent of Total 
Contributors, by  Income Interval. 
Percent with Contribution > 0  Percent of Total Contributors 
Income 
Intervalb  United States  Canada  United States  Canada 
0- 10  5.0  1.9  10.9  6.6 
10-20  11.3  13.4  28.0  31.8 
20-30  19.2  28.0  26.5  33.1 
30-40  32.4  45.1  17.2  14.9 
40-50  44.9  56.9  8.2  7.7 
50-60  - 
50-70  53.5 
60-70  - 
70-80  - 
70 +  59.3 
80-90  - 
59.5  - 
-  5.8 
58.5  - 
63.0  - 
-  3.4 







90-100  -  62.6  -  0.4 
1  .o  loo+  -  53.6  - 
"The Canadian data pertain to 1980 and the U.S. data to 1982. Tabulations for the United 
States are in U.S. dollars and those for Canada in Canadian dollars. Data for the United 
States are from the May 1983 CPS and supplemental Survey of Pension and Retirement 
Plan Coverage. The data are weighted to represent the employed population, ages 18- 
65, excluding the self-employed. The Canadian data are based on a random sample of 
tax filers and are weighted to represent all tax filers. 
CCalculations  are based on midpoints of  reported  IRA  contribution intervals (see ap- 
pendix B). 
thousands. 
while the U.S. data pertain only to employees and thus exclude con- 
tributions to Keogh plans. 
Individuals covered by  private pension plans in the United  States 
tend to make somewhat larger contributions than those who are not, 
and they are also somewhat more likely to make contributions at the 
limit, as shown in table 1.5. In Canada, the limit on RRSP contributions 
increases with income and the maximum is higher for persons without 
than for those with a private plan. Thus for high-income persons, con- 
tributions are higher for those without private plans. Nonetheless, for 
most income intervals those with a private pension plan are more likely 
to contribute at the limit. 
In summary, the descriptive data indicate that IRAs are typically not 
used by low-income employees, and that they do not in general serve 
as a substitute for private pension plans. 14  Steven F.  VentiIDavid A. Wise 
Table 1.3  Percent with Contributions at the Limit, by Income 
Interval and Sexs 
United States  Canada 
Income 
Intervalh  Men  Women  Men  Women 
0- 10  I .0  3.7  0.7  0.6 
10-20  3.8  9.2  2.8  4.1 
20-30  10.5  19.5  6.3  12.9 
30-40  21.8  33.4  17.3  25. I 
40-50  35.5  41 .0  34.0  36.7 
50-60  - 
50-70  44.4 




38.8  33.3 
45.6  29.9 
49.4  31.0 
5  I .9  30.5 
-  - 
-  - 
90- 100  -  -  51.3  24.7 
100+  -  -  45.7  19.0 
.%The  Canadian data pertain to I980 and the U.S.  data to 1982. Tabulations for the United 
States are in U.S.  dollars and those foi- Canada in Canadian dollars. Data for the United 
States arc from the May  1983 CPS and supplemental Survey of  Pension and Retirement 
Plan Coverage. The data arc weighted to represent the employed population. ages 18- 
65. excluding the self-employed. The Canadian data are based on a random sample of 
tax filers and are weighted to represent all tax filers. 
hIn thousands. 
1.2  The Statistical Model 
The results suggest that relatively unambiguous answers can be pro- 
vided to  the three questions addressed in this paper. On the other hand, 
an analysis of the effect of  tax-deferred  accounts on net saving will 
require related  but new and  somewhat more complicated  statistical 
procedures, and it seems apparent that this question will be answered 
with more ambiguity and less confidence than the first three. Thus it 
is  important to set forth the analysis  so that questions that can be 
answered relatively precisely can be distinguished from those that in- 
herently  leave room for doubt. To  put the analysis conducted in this 
paper in perspective, it may be useful to illustrate how it is related to 
a  more  general  analysis  designed  to estimate the net effect  of tax- 
deferred accounts on individual saving. With this goal in mind, a simple 
but general illustrative model is described first. It serves to motivate 
statistical analysis of each of the three questions discussed in this paper, 
while providing a framework within which the fourth question can be 15  The Determinants of IRA Contributions and the Effect of Limit Changes 
Table 1.4  Average Contribution,  by  Income Intervala 
United States  Canada 
Average.  Average. 
Given  Percent  Given  Percent 
Contri-  with Con-  Contri-  with Con- 
Income  bution  tribution  bution  tribution 
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NOTE:  The figures for the United  States are nor  comparable becuase the contribution 
limits are different in the two countries. 
.'The Canadian data pertain to 1980 and the U.S. data to 1982. Tabulations for the United 
States are in U.S. dollars and those for Canada in Canadian dollars. Data for the United 
States are from the May  1983 CPS and supplemental Survey of  Pension and Retirement 
Plan Coverage. The data are weighted to represent the employed population, ages  IX- 
65, excluding the self-employed.  The Canadian data are based on a random sample of 
tax filers and are weighted to represent all tax filers. 
cCalculations are based on midpoints  of  reported IRA contribution  intervals (see ap- 
pendix  B). 
dTaken to be greater than or equal to 95 percent of actual limit. 
thousands. 
addressed. It demonstrates succinctly how the first three questions are 
related to the fourth. The illustrative model also provides motivation 
for treating the first three separately from the fourth, although in prin- 
ciple, one general model could be used to address all four questions 
jointly. Estimation procedures designed to answer the first three ques- 
tions are then considered, with particular attention given to whether a 
correctly specified, single behavioral equation can be used to describe 
both zero and positive levels of tax-deferred  saving, or whether two 
behavioral relationships-one  describing whether a person is a potential 
contributor and the other the desired IRA contribution-are  required. 16  Steven E  VentUDavid A. Wise 
Table 1.5  Average Contributions and Percent with Contribution at the Limit, 
by  Income Interval and Private Pension Coverage" 
United States  Canada 
Employees  Employees  Employees 
Employees with  without  with RPP  without RPP 
Private Pension  Private Pension  Contributiond  Contribution' 
Income 
Intervalb  $c  %atL  $c  %atL  $  %atL  $  %atL 
0- 10  138  5.3  61  2.2  54  1.9  17  0.7 
10-20  190  7.2  161  5.7  188  3.5  161  3.0 
20-30  342  13.7  275  10.7  494  9.1  568  5.1 
30-40  588  24.1  516  20.9  830  22.8  1305  12.4 
40 -  50  883  38.2  650  25.9  983  39.3  2429  30.2 
50-60  -  -  -  -  1199  45.0  2654  31.9 
50-70  1073  48.5  809  35.7  -  -  -  - 
60-70  -  -  -  -  1381  47.9  2968  38.1 
70+  1170  51.7  978  44.0  -  -  -  - 
70-80  -  -  -  -  1355  40.0  3655  50.0 
80-90  -  -  -  -  1724  44.6  3396  50.1 
90- 100  -  -  -  -  1397  41.7  3646  51.3 
100 +  -  -  -  -  1503  37.8  3641  47.1 
aThe Canadian data pertain to 1980 and the U.S. data to 1982. Tabulations for the United 
States are in U.S. dollars and those for Canada in Canadian dollars. Data for the United 
States are from the May 1983 CPS and supplemental Survey of Pension and Retirement 
Plan Coverage. The data are weighted to represent the employed population, ages 18- 
65,  excluding the self-employed. The Canadian data are based on a random sample of 
tax filers and are weighted to represent all tax filers. 
CCalculations are based on midpoints of  reported  IRA contribution intervals (see ap- 
pendix B). 
dContributes to a Registered Pension Plan (RPP) 
'The  vast majority of this group do not have a pension plan. 
thousands. 
1.2.1  A General Illustrative Model 
Decisions about the amount to save in various forms are undoubtedly 
made jointly so that one decision cannot be considered fixed while the 
other is made. In addition, unmeasured individual attributes are likely 
to affect decisions about saving in each of two or more different forms. 
Thus persons who are observed to save more in one form are also likely 
to save more in another, not because saving in one form induces them 
to save more in another but rather because they are more inclined to 
save in any form. This means that one must disentangle the effects of 
individual-specific attributes from the effect that saving in one form has 
on saving in another. 17  The Determinants of IRA Contributions and the Effect of Limit Changes 
The procedure outlined here addresses these problems by consid- 
ering an individual’s preferred allocation of current income to current 
consumption, tax-deferred saving, and other forms of saving, and then 
by considering how observed choices are affected by the limit on the 
tax-deferred  saving alternative.  Based on such a model, it would be 
possible to simulate, for example, how total saving would be changed 
if  the limit on tax-deferred saving were raised  or lowered. The pro- 
cedure relies heavily on the fact that the optimal saving behavior of 
individuals who are not constrained by the limit differs from the be- 
havior of those who are, with a statistical correction for the fact that 
persons who are at the limit, everything else equal, are likely to have 
a greater preference for saving than those who are not constrained; 
they are likely to save more in any form. In practice, the idea is to 
estimate the parameters  of  a  “preference”  function whose  primary 
arguments are IRA contributions, at least one other form of  saving, 
and current consumption. Associated with the preference function are 
optimal IRA contributions and optimal saving in other forms. In prac- 
tice, it is necessary  to choose these “demand”  functions  to fit  the 
observable data and then to choose the preference function consistent 
with them. The procedure can be illustrated by a simple preference 
function. 
Suppose that preferences for consumption and saving out of current 
income may be described by the simple form: 
(1)  v = (y  -  S, -  s2)l-PI-P2  SIPl S2PZ, 
where Y is income, S1  and S2  are tax-deferred saving and other saving, 
respectively, and p, and p2  are parameters to be estimated. This func- 
tion is intended to represent preferences over possible allocations of 
current income conditional on individual attributes like income and 
age, and on individual perceptions of the riskiness of different forms 
of saving.* This approach allows inferences about the relationship of 
income allocation to age without constraining the functional form to 
correspond to a particular life-cycle hypothesis.  In practice, the pa- 
rameters would depend upon measured individual attributes and would 
be allowed to vary randomly among individuals to capture unmeasured 
variation in individual preferences for current versus future consump- 
tion as well as different perceptions of risk, and so forth. In this simple 
case, the unconstrained optimal saving choices are 
(2)  S1 = ply,  and 
s2  = p2Y. 
But in fact, the optimal choice is subject to a constraint; S1  contributions 
cannot be greater than the IRA limit L. Until this limit is reached, 
contributions obey the equations above. But more generally the S1  and 
S2 functions are of the form: 18  Steven E Venti/David A. Wise 
(3) 
if  ply  < L, 
if Ply  2  L, 
Thus there are two S2 saving functions. As long as the IRA limit has 
not been reached, saving obeys the optimizing rule pzY. But after the 
limit is reached, the saving function is of the form [P2/(1 -  PI)](  Y-  L). 
This illustration ignores the tax deferment that makes IRAs more at- 
tractive than alternative forms of retirement saving. Introducing the 
tax rate in the example changes the utility function to 
(4) 
where, assuming that saving is small relative to income, t is the marginal 
tax rate. The optimal saving choices then become 
v = [Y(1 - t) - S1(1 - t) -  SJ-pJ-fiSIpI  sp, 
s1  = {y  if  Ply  < L, 
if  Ply  2 L, 
if  p,Y < L, 
s2={  P2  (Y - L)(1 - t)  if  ply  2 L. 
P2V1 - 1) 
1 - PI 
In  this  formulation,  the marginal  tax rate does not affect  S1 (IRA) 
saving, unless  it  affects  preferences for current  versus future con- 
sumption  through  the parameters  PI and  P2. The empirical  findings 
reported below  suggest an uncertain effect  of the marginal tax rate 
independent of income, even though the rate of return on IRAs does 
depend on the marginal tax rate. 
In practice, the parameters P1  and P2 would be made functions of 
individual characteristics like age, occupation, possibly income itself, 
the tax rate, and other conditioning variables that would likely deter- 
mine individual preferences of possible allocations of current income. 
To  estimate the model, it  is  also necessary to choose a  stochastic 
specification for the Ps. One also needs to choose a specification that 
allows optimal,  or “desired”,  values Sl and S2 to be negative, since 
many individuals will not save in any form and indeed will b~rrow.~ 
As emphasized above, this particular functional  form is  only for 
illustrative purposes; the form that is ultimately chosen must be de- 
termined by the data. But this simple example demonstrates how changes 
in the limit may affect behavior.  In particular,  explicit reference to a 
preference function assures a specification of saving S2  after the limit 
L on S1 is reached that is internally consistent with the function that 19  The Determinants of IRA Contributions  and the Effect of Limit Changes 
applies before the limit is reached. And, in  a fully specified model, 
estimates of the ps could be used to simulate the effects of changes in 
the limit L on total saving, not just the effect on tax-deferred ~aving.~ 
Estimation of  only the S,  function is treated in this paper.5 
1.2.2  Independent Analysis of  Contributions to Tax-Deferred 
Saving Accounts 
Within the general framework described above, one can treat the 
tax-deferred saving equation separately. At least two important issues 
must be addressed in order to analyze determinants of  IRA contribu- 
tions. The first is simply that in addition to the upper limit on contri- 
butions, many individuals, indeed the majority, do not contribute any- 
thing at all to IRA (or Keogh) accounts. The standard way to conduct 
an analysis in this situation would be to use a Tobit model with a lower 
truncation point at zero and an upper truncation point at the contri- 
bution limit. The second issue, however, is that the determinants of 
whether one contributes at all may be different from the determinants 
of how much one contributes once an account is established. While it 
is true that the short-run effect of  changes in  contribution limits on 
total contributions is determined only by initial contributors, there may 
be considerably more room to change total contributions through in- 
creasing the number of persons who contribute than by increasing the 
contributions  of  current contributors.  It is  important,  therefore,  to 
understand the determinants of  the contributor status decision. 
Key Issues 
To provide accurate predictions of  the determinants of IRA contri- 
butions and of the effect on contributions of  changes in the existing 
contribution limits, the most important consideration in estimation is 
to account for the existing limit on observed contributions. Thus, an 
intuitive discussion of the effect of  the limit on estimation, together 
with procedures that can be used  to correct for it, helps to put the 
important ideas in perspective, although part of the discussion will be 
familiar to many readers. Mathematical details of the estimation pro- 
cedure are presented in appendix A. 
Consider first figure 1.1. Suppose that the relationship between in- 
come and IRA contributions if there were no contribution limits would 
be represented by the solid line a  + by. That is, given  Y the average 
(expected) contribution would be a  + by. Of  course, for any level of 
income Y there would be a distribution of  contribution levels, repre- 
sented by the vertical lines; not everyone with income level  Y would 
contribute the same amount. Now suppose that everyone in the sample 
faced a contribution limit L. We  would now observe no contributions 
above L,  and presumably individuals who otherwise would contribute 20  Steven F.  VentVDavid A. Wise 
Fig. 1.1  Effect of  contribution limits on estimation. 
above this limit would in  the face of the limit contribute at the limit. 
This would give rise to a concentration of contributions at the limit, 
indicated by the heavy dots at that level. In addition, it is not possible 
to contribute less than zero; we would observe a concentration &points 
at zero, indicated by the heavy dots along the horizontal axis. If we 
think of fitting a line, say by least squares, to the data points that are 
actually  observed, we  would obtain a fitted line  something like the 
dashed line in the figure. 
Suppose that from this fitted line we attempted to predict the rela- 
tionship between income and contributions S. It is easy to see that this 
estimate would be a very substantial underprediction. Thus it is clear 
that standard estimation procedures will not lead to plausible conclu- 
sions in this case. And it should also be clear from the figure that the 
reason is that observed contributions do not represent the contributions 
that individuals would like to make were they not constrained by the 
limit. 
It is also useful to consider the distribution of  contributions for per- 
sons with a particular level of  income, say Y*.  An illustration of such 
a distribution is show in figure 1.2. If it were not for the limit at L and 
the limit at zero, the distribution of contributions S would look some- 
thing like a bell-shaped curve. But as demonstrated in figure 1.1, we 
know that we will not observe contributions greater than L, and we 21  The Determinants of IRA Contributions and the Effect of Limit Changes 
will observe no contributions less than zero. The distribution of ob- 
served contributions between zero and L would look just like the un- 
derlying curve. But instead of a distribution tapering off smoothly to 
the right and to the left, there would be concentrations of contributions 
at L and at zero. 
The standard Tobit maximum likelihood estimation procedure that 
takes account of this truncation effect is based on an assumed under- 
lying relationship like a  + b Y,  as show in figure 1.1, together with a 
distribution of contributions around this relationship. In this case there 
are three possible outcomes: the contribution is zero, it is between 
zero and L,  or it is at L. The values of  a, 6, and u  that maximize the 
likelihood of observing the sample values yield estimates of the rela- 
tionship labeled  a  +  bY in  figure  1.1, as well as the dispersion  of 
underlying observations around this expected value. Thus the estimates 
that are obtained need to be interpreted as pertaining to this underlying 
relationship.  For example, b indicates the relationship between  Y and 
S  if there were no limit on contributions. Or, it tells us how an increase 
in income would affect contributions as long as the contribution limit 
was not reached; after that, contributions would be observed at the 
limit L but desired contributions would be above L. 
It is also important to realize that only persons who are constrained 
by the current limit will be affected by a new higher limit. (If the limit 
is lowered, of  course, increasingly large numbers of  people will  be 
constrained by it.) With the help of figure 1.2, it is easy to determine 
the effect  of  small changes in  L  on contributions.  Consider first an 
individual whose observed contribution is less than L. Such an indi- 
vidual could contribute more but chooses not to; he is not constrained 
by the limit. His desired contribution level is less than L, so raising 
the limit would not increase his contribution level. Consider, on the 
other hand, a person who is observed to contribute at the limit L. If 
L were raised, this person would likely contribute more. Thus the effect 
0  a+bY*  L  L' 
Fig. 1.2  Distribution of contributions, given income level P. 22  Steven F.  Ventmawid A. Wise 
of raising the limit by 1 is just 1 times the probability that the individual 
is constrained by the limit. Somewhat more formally, we can write the 
derivative as 
= 0.  Pr[C < L] +  1 . Pr[C > Ll 
= Pr[C > L]. 
Thus for any individual the expected change in the contribution level 
is equal to the probability that the underlying desired contribution is 
greater than L. 
It is also important to realize that this derivative depends upon the 
level of L. Suppose that L were farther to the right than is shown in 
figure 1.2, say at L'. The effect on contributions of an increase in the 
limit from L' would be much smaller than the effect of an increase from 
L because the likelihood that an individual with income P would like 
to contribute more than L'  is much lower than the likelihood that he 
would like to contribute more than L. While all people, or almost all 
people, with observed contributions at L would increase their contri- 
butions if  the limit were raised, very few would increase their contri- 
butions to the level L'. Thus to infer the effect of an increase in the 
limit on contributions, it is necessary to have an estimate of the un- 
derlying distribution of  desired contribution levels. With an estimate 
of the distribution of S given P,  it is possible to predict the expected 
contribution given P for any level of  L. 
Estimation Possibilities 
In practice, estimates that address the issues discussed above can 
be developed in several ways, depending on the hypothesized under- 
lying process that leads to observed contributions. There are two basic 
possibilities. The first possibility assumes, as in the discussion above, 
that zero contributions can be thought of simply as a special case of a 
single underlying preferred contribution behavioral relationship. That 
is, one could think of a preferred contribution level that declines con- 
tinuously with decreases in income until the zero contribution level is 
reached. The second general possibility is that there are two underlying 
behavioral  relationships  that  determine observed contributions:  one 
relationship describes the likelihood that a person will be a contributor 
and the second relationship describes the desired contribution, should 
one be a contributor. 
If only one behavioral relationship is assumed, there are at least three 
ways to obtain estimates. The alternative procedures allow a test of 23  The Determinants of IRA Contributions  and the Effect of Limit Changes 
the underlying assumption itself. One procedure uses all observations 
including those with zero contributions; the second uses only obser- 
vations with positive contributions; and the third uses only the infor- 
mation on whether a person contributes without using the amount of 
a positive contribution.6 If  there is, in fact, only one underlying rela- 
tionship that  determines observed  contributions,  then each of  these 
methods yields consistent estimates of  the parameters of this single 
relationship (except for the third which yields estimates up to a variance 
scaling factor). If  the estimates based  on the different groups of  ob- 
servations lead to different estimates, then it is likely that the underlying 
process should be described by  two relationships. 
If the goal of the analysis were only to predict the effect of changes 
in the limits, it is reasonable to concentrate on those who contribute 
and to allow the parameter estimates to be determined by this group, 
since noncontributors are not initially affected by changes in the limit. 
It is at least as important, however, to understand  the factors that 
determine whether a person is a contributor. As emphasized above, 
changes in the number of contributors at any limit could have a much 
greater effect on national saving than changes in the limit. To the extent 
that the determinants of whether one is a contributor are different from 
the determinants of the amount of the contribution, it is important to 
consider both of these relationships. The formal details of a two-equa- 
tion model, together with details of the single-equation estimation pos- 
sibilities and related tests of behavioral assumptions, are presented in 
appendix A. 
1.2.3  The Empirical Specification 
In the illustrative specification in section 1.2.1,  desired contributions 
to tax-deferred  saving are of  the form  S  =  PY. A  direct  statistical 
counterpart of this specification is 
(6)  S  = PYee = aYb . Y . ec = c~y-OX,~lX~a2  . . . Yb . Y .  et. 
Based on estimates for Canada, this specification fits the observations 
on positive contributions extremely well. Note that the specification 
implies  that given  Y (and the other variables X) the  variance  of  S 
increases with  Y;  the disturbance term is heteroscedastic. The speci- 
fication also leads to a constant income elasticity and is conveniently 
log-linear. However, this specification is not appropriate if  we incor- 
porate contributions at zero and, in  the abstract, the possibility  of 
desired contributions less than zero. To  consider whether the deter- 
minants of contributor status are different from the determinants of the 
amount of positive contributions, a specification that in principle allows 
negative as well as positive values and that also fits the observations 24  Steven F.  Venti/David A. Wise 
on positive contributions must be used. Such a specification, and one 
that in practice fits the observed data well, is of the form 
(7)  s = a + (Yb + q)Y + E 
= 010  + Ol,x, + a*X2  + . . . + V+h  + qY + E, 
where q and E  are disturbance terms and the variance of qY  + E is 
given by 
(8) 
Thus the specification incorporates the property that the variance of 
S  increases with income, and it also allows for “desired” contributions 
less than zero. The elasticity of desired contributions with respect to 
income is given by (1  + b)/[l  + (U/Y’+~)]  and thus approaches 1  + b 
as income increases.’ 
For simplification, appendix A, which describes the details of  the 
alternative estimation procedures,  is written  in  terms of  the  specifi- 
cation S = Xp + E, where  V(E) = u2. Development in  terms of the 
above specification may be obtained by replacing Xp  by  a  + Y’ 
+
  and 
u* by  (u:Y2  + ut). Recall that  the three  single-equation approaches 
use: (a) all observations including those with zero contributions (two- 
limit Tobit); (b) only observations with positive contributions (one-limit 
Tobit); and (c) only information on contributor status (probit). A two- 
equation model that jointly estimates contributor and contribution out- 
comes is also described in appendix A. This model permits the deter- 
minants of whether a person contributes to differ from the determinants 
of the desired level of a positive contribution and allows the stochastic 
components of the two choices to be correlated. 
In addition, the CPS data on IRA contributions are reported only 
by intervals-$0,  $0-$100,  $100-$500, $500-$1000, $1000-$2000. Thus 
the probabilities of positive contributions are of the form 
(9) 
where u and 1 are the upper and lower bounds of an interval, and a[.] 
denotes the standard normal distribution function. Thus the likelihood 
function in this case includes no density function terms; it is composed 
only of  normal cumulative  distribution functions. This may be con- 
trasted with the Canadian data that record exact positive contributions. 
V(qY + E)  = U%Y* + a:  = U2 
@[(u -  XP)/U] -  @[(/ - XP)/U], 
1.3  Results 
1.3.1  Data 
The data were obtained through a special supplement to the May 
1983 Current Population Survey (CPS). The data on IRA contributions 25  The Determinants of IRA Contributions and the Effect of Limit Changes 
pertain to the 1982 tax year. No information is provided on 1982 con- 
tributions to Keogh plans, thus self-employed persons have been ex- 
cluded from this analysis. In addition, the raw data pertain to individ- 
uals, not families. Some of the estimates reported below are based on 
the individual data, with indicator variables for marital status and sex. 
Since it is not known from the individual data whether an individual’s 
spouse works, the actual upper limit on family contributions cannot be 
determined from the individual data alone. Some individuals reported 
contributions greater than $200&primarily  at $2250 and at $4000, ap- 
parently confusing individual contributions with the family total. When 
the individual data are used, contributions above $2000 are not explic- 
itly recorded at that level, rather any reported contribution above $2000 
is treated  as a contribution at the $2000 limit.  Under the model as- 
sumption, this procedure still yields unbiased parameter estimates; it 
simply does not use all the information. 
Family data were created by matching and combining information 
for individuals in the same household. This allows estimation of family 
income and of family IRA contribution limits based on the employment 
status of the husband and wife. Estimated marginal tax rates were also 
calculated for the family. The estimates were based on average marginal 
tax rates by income and family status reported by the IRS. As men- 
tioned above, IRA contributions for each family member are reported 
only by intervals. The intervals for a family were obtained by inferring 
the possible  family intervals from the  possible individual  reporting 
intervals. There are twelve possible family intervals in total. Details 
of the procedures used to create the family data and the tax rates are 
reported in appendix B. 
1.3.2  Parameter Estimates: Single-Equation Models 
Individual Duta 
Estimates by three methods of estimation are reported in tables 1.6 
and 1.7. Summary statistics for the variables included in each equation 
are presented  in appendix C. Table  1.7 includes variables indicating 
whether a person was covered by a private pension plan and whether 
the worker participated in a salary reduction plan  (401[K] or 403[B] 
plans which permit  workers to defer compensation); these variables 
are not included in table 1.6. Column 1 in each table presents estimates 
based on the two-limit Tobit specification. Column 2 shows probit es- 
timates  where  the  standard  error  of  E is  set  at the two-limit  Tobit 
estimate (e.g., 5622 in table 1.6). This allows easy comparison of the 
two sets of estimates. It may be seen that the parameter estimates are 
virtually the same. Whether there is a difference between the deter- 
minants of contribution status and the determinants of the desired level 26  Steven F.  VentVDavid A. Wise 
Table 1.6  Parameter Estimates, by  Method of  Estimation, Individual DataP 
Method of Estimation 
Probit,  Probit, 
a, from  a<  from 
2-Limit  2-Limit  I-Limit  I-Limit 
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986(73) 
230(12) 








aStandard errors are in parentheses 
bMarginal tax rate. 
‘Likelihood  function. 
of IRA contributions may not be revealed by this comparison, however, 
since the preponderance of  individuals make no contribution and thus 
the contribution status (the probit portion) will dominate the two-limit 
estimates. The two-limit Tobit estimates will therefore tend to look like 
the probit estimates. 
A  better way to reveal differences in  the two relationships is to 
separate analysis of  contribution amounts from the analysis of con- 
tributor status. The 1-limit Tobit estimates in  column  3  of  the tables 
are based  only on the contributions of  contributors, and the probit 
estimates of contributor status in column 4  are obtained by setting the 
standard error of  E equal to the one-limit estimate (e.g., 2015 in table 
1.6). These last two columns reveal that the two sets of  coefficients 
are quite similar. The reported coefficient on income is the estimate of 
(1  + b). It is virtually the same in each of the alternative methods, 
and the estimated parameters on age seem not to be significantly dif- 
ferent in the two cases. The estimated sex effects are also very close 
in the two cases, with one exception. The estimates suggest that un- 
married men contribute more than married men (the omitted category) 27  The Determinants of IRA Contributions and the Effect of Limit Changes 
~~ 
Table 1.7  Parameter Estimates, by Method of Estimation, Individual Datas 
Method of  Estimation 
Probit,  Probit, 
ue  from  u, from 
2-Limit  2-Limit  I-Limit  I-Limit 
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aStandard errors are in parentheses. 
bMarginal tax rate. 
CLikelihood  function. 
but are apparently no more likely than married men to contribute. The 
constant terms in the two equations differ, although given the estimated 
standard errors, the difference may not be as great as the estimated 
values suggest. 
A more formal test is to compare the sum of the likelihood values 
from columns 3 and 4 with the likelihood value in column 1. Under the 
null hypothesis is that one behavioral relationship is sufficient to de- 
scribe both contributor status and the amount of contributions, the sum 
of the likelihoods in columns 3 and 4 will not be statistically different 
from the likelihood value in column  1. (Minus 2 times the difference 
will be distributed chi-square with 7 degrees of freedom, with a  .05 
level  of  14.1.) Thus the hypothesis  would  be  rejected  in this  case. 
However, the very large sample size will reveal differences even if they 
have rather small practical importance. 
The coefficient on income of  .753  implies an elasticity of  desired 
contribution with respect to income of  .63, evaluated at the mean of 
the data for contributors. The desired contribution increases by about 
$1 10 with each year of age according to the estimates for contributors, 28  Steven F.  VentVDavid A. Wise 
while the comparable estimate from the probit equation is $81. Given 
other variables, married women would choose to contribute about $lo00 
more than married men and the more educated would contribute more 
than those with less education. The estimated unmarried women effect 
is not statistically significant. 
Summary statistics presented in table 1.5 suggested that employees 
covered by a private pension plan were more likely to contribute to an 
IRA. Parameter estimates in table  1.7, however, suggest that the as- 
sociation between pension coverage and IRA contributions can be at- 
tributed to other differences in the individual characteristics of those 
covered and not covered by a pension plan. After controlling for other 
characteristics, pension  plan coverage is not significantly associated 
with desired contributions. Participation in a salary reduction plan (less 
than  4 percent  of  the  sample)  is  positively  associated  with  IRA 
contributions. 
Both the two-limit and one-limit models fit the data rather well. This 
is demonstrated in table 1.8. Based on the estimates in table 1.6, the 
Table 1.8  Model Fit; Actual versus Predicted Proportions by Income 
Interval, Contribution Interval, and Method of  Estimations 
Contribution Interval 
Zero  Between  At Limit  $0-$500  $500-$1OOO  $1000-$2000 
Income  ~  ~  ~  ~ 
















.95  .94  .02  .03  .03  .03  .01  .01  .01  .01  .01  .O1 
.89  .89  .05  .04  .06  .06  .01  .01  .O1  .01  .02  .02 
.81  .80  .06  .07  .I3  .13  .02  .02  .02  .02  .03  .03 
.68  .69  .08  .09  .23  .22  .01  .02  .02  .02  .05  .04 
.56  .57  .09  .09  .35  .33  .01  .02  .0  1  .02  .07  .04 
.47  .45  .I0  .08  .43  .47  .01  .02  .02  .02  .07  .04 
.38  .33  .08  .06  .54  .60  .OO  .01  .02  .02  .06  .03 
I-Limit Tobit 
--  .43  .48  .57  .52  - - -  -_ - 
__ -  .43  .41  .57  .59  - - - 
.33  .35  .67  .65  - - - 
.19  .22  .81  .78  - - - 
__ 
__ -  -_ 
_-  .27  .27  .73  .73  - - -  -_ - 
__  .18  .I7  .82  .83  - - -  -- - 
__  .I3  .I3  .88  .87  - - -  -_ - 
__ -  -_ 
aA = actual; P = predicted. 
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predicted proportion of  individuals with contributions at zero, at the 
upper limit, and within selected intervals are compared with the actual 
proportions, by income interval. It is important in interpreting these 
results to realize that gross misspecification of the functional form that 
relates contributions to income would be revealed in the comparisons 
by income level. The comparisons indicate close correspondence be- 
tween predicted and actual proportions. The only apparent discrepancy 
is that the two-limit Tobit specification underpredicts  the proportion 
of contributions in  the $1000-$2000  range and correspondingly over- 
predicts the proportion of contributions at the limit. Given the differ- 
ences between a few of the two-limit and one-limit parameter estimates, 
the similarity of the predictions may be surprising. However, the major 
difference in parameter estimates is a larger negative constant term in 
the two-limit than in the one-limit specification, which is offset by a 
larger disturbance term variance. The likelihood function is quite flat 
with respect to these two parameters. Thus the sum of the last two 
likelihoods is not so different in magnitude from the two-limit Tobit 
likelihood. 
Family Data 
Parameter estimates based on the family data are reported in table 
1.9. The variable specification is identical to that used for the individual 
data with two exceptions: the marginal tax rate (MTR) has been added 
and the dummy variable for “married women” has been deleted, with 
non-single-person families the norm group. Married men and women 
appear together in the family data, but as two separate observations 
in the individual data. 
Where the variables are the same, the parameter estimates are very 
similar to those based on the individual data. For example, the esti- 
mated  income coefficient based  on the two-limit Tobit model  is  .78 
using family data and 34  using individual data. The effects of age and 
education are also quite close. 
The results suggest that the marginal tax rate has no effect on the 
amount of contributions but a positive effect on contributor status. The 
coefficient on the estimated marginal tax rate in the two-limit specifi- 
cation is 200 with a standard error of 39. This would suggest that an 
increase of ten percentage points in the marginal tax rate would increase 
desired IRA contributions by about $2000. On the other hand, the one- 
limit and probit estimates in columns 3 and 4 suggest that the tax rate 
has no effect on the level of  contributions (column 3) but a positive 
effect on contributor status (column 4). The latter estimate implies that 
if  all marginal tax rates were increased by ten percentage points-n 
average from about 24 percent to 34 percent-the  proportion of persons 
who contribute would increase from .I34 to .193, or by 44 percent. 30  Steven F.  VentVDavid A. Wise 
Table 1.9  Parameter Estimates, by Method of Estimation, Family Data. 
Method of Estimation 
Probit,  Probit, 
u, from  ere from 
2-Limit  2-Limit  1-Limit  1-Limit 
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"Standard errors are in parentheses. 
bMarginal tax rate. 
CLikelihood  function. 
Canadian estimates for 1981 (see section 1.4) show a much smaller 
statistically  significant effect of the marginal tax rate on contributor 
status,  with  a  smaller  and  not  statistically  significant effect  on the 
amount of contributions. (But the difference between the two estimates 
is also not significantly different from zero.) Canadian estimates for 
1976 show no effect of the marginal tax rate in either equation.8 An 
alternative log-linear model for contributors only shows a precisely 
estimated zero effect of the marginal tax rate on the amount of con- 
tributions in both 1976 and 1980. Thus the estimated effect seems quite 
sensitive to the statistical specification. 
Table 1.10 includes indicators of pension coverage and participation 
in a salary reduction plan. These estimates indicate that if at least one 
member of a family is  covered by  a pension plan, the likelihood of 
contributing to an IRA is higher. The individual data suggested essen- 
tially no relationship.  A possible explanation is that married persons 
without pensions, but whose spouses are covered by a pension, have 
a high likelihood of contributing to an IRA. In the individual data, these 
people would be treated as not having a private pension. 31  The Determinants of IRA Contributions and the Effect of Limit Changes 
Table 1.10  Parameter Estimates, by  Method of Estimation, Family DataP 
Method of Estimation 
Probit,  Probit, 
u, from  ue  from 
2-Limit  2-Limit  I-Limit  1-Limit 
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aStandard errors are in parentheses. 
bMarginal tax rate. 
‘Likelihood  function. 
1.3.3  Simulations: Single-Equation Models 
Simulations are obtained under three policy assumptions: the existing 
IRA program, the proposal contained in the administration’s recent tax 
reform proposal (U.S. Department of Treasury  1984), and a modifi- 
cation of the Treasury proposal that restricts spousal IRAs. The Trea- 
sury proposal increases the limits to $2500 for both employed persons 
and nonemployed  spouses. The modified Treasury proposal also in- 
creases the limit for employed persons to $2500 but sets the spousal 
limit at $500, instead of $2500. 
Simulations based on the family data are presented in table  1.11.9 
To serve as a basis for comparison, the average IRA contribution under 
the current plan has been simulated for several demographic groups. 
The model  yields an average predicted  contribution for all families 
under  the current plan  of  $312.1°  The  simulations indicate  that  the 
Treasury plan would increase 1982 contributions by 30 percent to $405 
per family. The largest increases are for married, one-earner families 
whose limit is increased by the Treasury proposal from $2250 to $5000. 32  Steven F.  VentilDavid A. Wise 
Table 1.11  Simulated IRA Contributions, by  Plan and Family Type, Based on 
Family Datas 
Current Plan  Treasury Plan  Mod. Treas. Plan 
Family Type  ($2000/$250)  ($2500/$2500)  ($2500/$500) 
All Families 
Avg. Contribution  $312  $405  $370 
% Change  -  30  18 
Unmamed Head 
Avg. Contribution  136  162 
% Change  -  19 
Mamed, 1 Earner 
Avg. Contribution  267  475 
% Change  -  78 
Avg. Contribution  536  620 
% Change  -  16 







aThese estimates are unweighted, since it was not clear what weights should be used for 
the “created” families. 
The predicted average contribution for this group would increase from 
$267 to $475, about 78 percent. The smallest increase, about 16 percent, 
is for married, two-earner families whose limit increased  only from 
$4000 to $5000. 
The modified Treasury plan yields an overall increase of about 18 
percent.  The limit changes, and thus contributor responses, for un- 
married heads and mamed, two-earner families are the same as in the 
unmodified Treasury proposal. The modified Treasury plan increases 
the limit faced by married, one-earner families by only $750, from $2250 
to $3000, instead of $5000. The simulated increase in average contri- 
butions by this group is 25 percent, about a third as large as the sim- 
ulated increase under the Treasury plan. 
Simulations based on the individual data are shown in table  1.12. 
Unlike  the  family data, the individual  data do not  provide  enough 
information to completely specify the limit faced by each person. Em- 
ployed single persons face a limit of $2000. For married couples the 
limits are $2000 per person if both work and $2250 if  only one works. 
If both work, then both will appear in the sample and the appropriate 
limit for each is $2000. If only one is employed, however, the nonem- 
ployed spouse will not be present in the sample, since only employed 
persons received the CPS pension supplement questionnaire. The ap- 
propriate limit for the employed  spouse is $2250. The problem is to 
assign the “correct”  limit ($2000 or $2250) to each married person in 
the sample, given that we do not know if  the spouse is employed.  I’ 
If the married person is a woman, a limit of $2000 is assigned, assuming 
that her spouse also works. If  the married person is a man, the limit 33  The Determinants of IRA  Contributions and the Effect of Limit Changes 
~~  ~  ~~ 
Table 1.12  Simulated IRA Contributions, by  Plan Based on Individual Dataa 
Current Plan  Treasury Plan  Mod. Treas. Plan 














































=Weighted to reflect national population. 
is randomly  assigned.  With probability P it is set at $2000 and with 
probability 1  -P  at $2250, where P is the proportion of wives of working 
husbands that are employed. 
The individual data simulations based on this procedure are quite 
close to those obtained using the family data. For  all persons,  the 
simulations indicate that the Treasury plan would increase 1982 con- 
tributions by  about  33 percent  and that the modified Treasury plan 
would increase contributions by about 20 percent. The largest effects 
are for married men, the group facing the largest change in limits. 
1.3.4  Parameter Estimates: Two-Equation Model 
The above results suggest that the observed outcomes can in general 
be  described well with a single behavioral  relationship.  If  two rela- 
tionships are required, the one-limit Tobit and the probit models to- 
gether, even if  estimated independently, should provide a reasonably 
accurate description of the determination of  contributions.  The two- 
equation model described in appendix A, however, distinguishes be- 
tween a “potential”  contributor behavioral relationship and the level 
of desired contributions, were one to contribute. Under this represen- 
tation, a potential contributor could be observed with zero contribu- 
tions not because the person  was a noncontributor,  but rather,  say, 
because income was too low for the person to devote current income 
to future consumption. To  the extent that the parameters in the two 
relationships differ, the single-equation probit estimates, for example, 
will not provide accurate estimates of  potential contributor status. As 34  Steven F.  VentVDavid A. Wise 
the parameters in the two relationships become close, and the corre- 
lation between them approaches  1, however, the two-equation model 
approaches the two-limit Tobit specification. If only the variable coef- 
ficients were the same, the results could differ if the correlation between 
the disturbance terms in the two relationships were not unity. 
Estimation of several two-equation models indicated only minor dif- 
ferences between parameters based on the single-equation models and 
those derived from two relationships estimated jointly. The two-equa- 
tion model is of  the form 
s = a, +  Yb” + q,Y + E, 
c = a, + Yb. + qcY + E, 
Contributor Status 
Contribution Amount 
The details of the specification and estimation procedure are described 
in  section 2 of  appendix A. The key distinction between the specifi- 
cation used here and the common sample-selection specification is that 
even potential contributors can have zero contributions, while others 
would  not  contribute  under  any circumstances. Only the latter are 
“noncontributors”  in the strict sense. 
Illustrative estimates for this model are presented in table  1.13. In 
this specification,  V(qc)  =  V(q,),  V(E,)  =  V(E,), and all covariances 
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825(92) 
250( 19) 
=Standard errors are in parentheses. 
bMarginal tax rate. 
=Likelihood function. 35  The Determinants of IRA Contributions and the Effect of Limit Changes 
other than cov(q,,  qs)  are set to zero. Education is excluded from the 
contributions equation. In practice, covariance or exclusion restrictions 
were required for identification of key parameters. Because the like- 
lihood function was so flat, more restrictions were necessary than were 
in principle required. 
The parameter estimates indicate that the correlation between qc  and 
qs  is not significantly different from zero.  l2 This suggests independence 
of the contributor and contributions relationships, given measured in- 
dividual characteristics.  Thus these estimates  are very close to the 
single-equation results presented in columns 3 and 4 of table 1.6.13 
In principle, however, this specification allows estimation of the pro- 
portion of  persons who are potential contributors but, because of  a 
liquidity constraint, for example, are observed not to contribute. The 
probability that a person does not contribute is given in this specifi- 
cation by  1 - Pr[S < 01  + Pr[S > 0 but C < 01.  Averaged over all 
observations in the sample, the proportion of noncontributors is 354, 
the same as in the probit estimates based on individual data. A pro- 
portion  of  .146 contribute. The proportion  of  potential contributors, 
Pr[S > 01,  is estimated to be  .182. Thus, the proportion of potential 
contributors who do not contribute, Pr[S > 0 but C < 01, is estimated 
to be .036, about 20 percent of potential contributors. 
1.4  Comparison of Results for the United States and Canada 
Since the Canadian and the U.S. systems are very similar in their 
general outlines, it is informative to compare the model estimates for 
the two countries. The Canadian equivalent of IRA and Keogh plans 
is the Registered Retirement Savings Plan (RRSP). RRSP contributions 
are also tax-deferred and have upper limits determined both by income 
and by a maximum level. The Canadian rules also provide for different 
limits depending on whether a person is a member of a private pension 
plan. 
Since the Canadian tax system is on an individual basis, the most 
appropriate comparison is with the individual estimates for the United 
States. Estimates analogous to those in table 1.6 for the United States 
are shown in table 1.14 for Canada. While the general model specifi- 
cation is identical in the two countries, the specific variables do not 
correspond precisely. In particular, the variables for women, married, 
and education are not included in the Canadian version, and there is 
no marginal tax rate variable  in the U.S.  version.  The comparable 
parameter estimates ,  however, are surprisingly similar, based on a com- 
parison of  the one-limit Tobit and the corresponding probit estimates 
in the two countries. The coefficient on income is .75 in the United 
States, while it is approximately .81 in Canada. The estimated effect 36  Steven F.  Ventmavid A. Wise 
Table 1.14  RRSP Contribution Parameter Estimates, by Method of 
Estimation, Totals, 198lS 
Probit,  Probit, 
Group  a, from  a, from 
and  2-Limit  2-Limit  1-Limit  I-Limit 
Variable  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit 
U?  .106(  ,006)  .096(  .O 14)  .125(.032)  .103(.015) 
Ue 
Constant  -9151(561)  -8951(466)  -  11657(4690)  -9539(498) 
2999( 183)  -  3 199(632)  - 
Income  .794(.008)  .789(.009)  .807(  ,036)  .795(  .009) 
MTRb  37(8)  39(8)  28(40)  42@) 
Age  62(9)  6 I(9)  79(47)  65(10) 
Govt . Employee  -  -  -  - 
Employee w/RPP  - 
Self-Employed  - 
Professional  - 
Farrner/Fisherman  -  -  -  - 
LFC  -6583.8  -  1763.9  -  48 1  8.9  -  1763.9 
N  4038  4038  1083  4038 
-  -  - 
-  -  - 




2955  2955 
’16  }  1083 
567 
-  2955 
567  516  t 
1083 
”Standard errors are in parentheses. 
bMarginal tax rate. 
=Likelihood function. 
of age is approximately $80 to $1 10 in the United States, while it is $65 
to $80 in Canada. The estimates for Canada also show a close corre- 
spondence between the one-limit Tobit and the probit estimates, in- 
dicating that a single behavioral relationship apparently describes the 
observations rather well. Indeed, for Canada the estimates in the two 
equations are not statistically different, based on the chi-squared test 
described above. 
As already discussed, the estimated effect of the marginal tax rate 
in Canada is not statistically different from zero in the contributions 
equation; the estimate for the United  States, reported for the family 
data in table 1.9, is also not statistically different from zero. In both 
countries the effect of the tax rate on contribution status is positive, 
although it is much smaller in Canada. As emphasized earlier, these 
results are very  sensitive to model  specifications and it may  not be 
possible to distinguish the effect of the marginal tax rate from a non- 
linear effect of income.I4 
The parameter estimates from a more highly parameterized  model 
for Canada are shown in table 1.15. The variable “employee w/RPP” 
indicates individuals in Canada with a private pension plan. Neither 37  The Determinants of IRA Contributions and the Effect of Limit Changes 
Table 1.15  RRSP Contribution Parameter Estimates, by Method of 
Estimation, Grouped, 1981" 
Probit,  Probit, 
Group  u, from  rr,  from 
and  2-Limit  2-Limit  I-Limit  I-Limit 
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"Standard errors are in parentheses 
hMarginal tax rate. 
'Likelihood  function. 
estimate is statistically different from zero, although the one-limit es- 
timate is quite negative. In the United States, there appears to be no 
relationship between pension coverage and IRA contributions based 
on individual data, although there is some evidence of a positive pen- 
sion relationship in the family data. 
Because data in Canada are available for several consecutive years, 
it is possible to check the validity of the model specifications for that 
country. Between 1976 and 198  1, the Canadian Consumer Price Index 
increased by about 60 percent, but RRSP limits did not change over 
the period. Thus in real terms the limits declined very substantially 
between those years.  Thus a good external check of  the predictive 
validity of the model is to use estimates for one of the years to predict 
contributions  in  the  other, when  the  limit  was  either considerably 
higher or much lower. Such predictions, using the two-limit and the 
one-limit estimates reported in  table 1.15, are shown in table 1.16. In 
general, the predicted values are very close to the actual ones. For 
example, one-limit estimates for 1981 underpredict  1976 contributions 
by  only  1.7 percent,  and  one-limit estimates  for  1976 underpredict 
1981 contributions by only  1.1 percent. Estimates based on the two- 38  Steven F.  VentVDavid A. Wise 
Table 1.16  Predicted Total Contributions for 1976 Based on 1981 Estimates 
and Predicted Total Contributions for 1981 Based on 1976 
Estimates, by  Estimation Method, Using Estimation FilesP 
For 1976 Based on 1981 Estimates 
Actual:  2149 
Predicted: 
Two-Limit  1920 
One-Limit  2133 
Difference 
-  10.7% 
-  1.7% 
For 1981 Based on 1976 Estimates 
Actual:  4810 
Predicted: 
Difference 
Two-Limit  4940  +2.7% 
One-Limit  4754  -  1.1% 
aEstimates are based on parameter estimates in table  1.15. 
limit model  also yield  predicted  values very close to actual values. 
Since the parameter estimates in the two countries are rather close, 
this  suggests  that  the  model  also should  predict rather well  in  the 
United States. 
1.5  Conclusions 
Persons with  low  incomes are unlikely  to have  IRA accounts. In 
addition, after controlling for income, age, and other variables, persons 
without private pension plans are no more likely than those with them 
to contribute to an IRA. Indeed, if anything, those with private plans 
contribute more than those without them. Both contributor status and 
the amount of positive contributions are determined in large part by 
income and, to a lesser extent, by demographic characteristics. The 
marginal tax rate may have a positive effect on whether one contrib- 
utes, but  it  does not  appear to influence  the contribution amount. 
Results based on different specifications suggest that it may be difficult 
to distinguish  the effect  of  the marginal  tax  rate from a  nonlinear 
income effect.  Simulations  based on the estimates suggest  that the 
current U.S. Treasury Department proposal would lead to about a 30 
percent increase in  IRA contributions.  l5  Model  estimates based on 
Canadian data for RRSPs are very similar to those for the United 
States. External checks of  the predictive  validity  of  the model  for 
Canada indicate  that predictions  of the effects  of  limit changes are 
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Appendix A 
Estimation of IRA Contributions 
To  estimate IRA contributions, there are two possible methods. The 
first is to assume that one underlying behavioral relationship leads to 
all of  the observed  outcomes.  In this  case there are three  ways  to 
estimate the same parameters, and the difference between the estimates 
can serve as a basis for a test of the assumption that one behavioral 
relationship is sufficient. If  it is not, the second method is to assume 
that observed behavior results from two behavioral relationships, one 
pertaining to the decision to be a contributor and the other describing 
the desired amount of  contributions,  were one a contributor. These 
two methods are described in turn. The first is familiar to many readers, 
and the goal here is simply to make clear that, under the maintained 
hypothesis, the three approaches all yield estimates of the same pa- 
rameters. The second method is not as familiar but is a generalization 
of a similar procedure in Deaton and Irish (1984). 
1.  A Single Behavioral Relationship 
Assume the following notation: 
s = Observed contribution, 
S  = Latent contribution “propensity,” 
X = Vector of individual attributes, 
L = Contribution limit, 
E = Random disturbance term, 
i = Individual indexes. 
Latent contributions are specified as 
s;  = x;p, + E;, 
where ei is assumed to be distributed normal with mean zero and vari- 
ance u2. Precise amounts contributed by each individual to an IRA are 
not reported.  Instead, we know if  the individual did or did not con- 
tribute and, if a contribution was made, the interval in which the con- 
tribution falls. Details on the intervals are presented in appendix B. 
The intervals16 may be summarized as 
s;  5  Lo, 
l5-1 < sj < L,, 
LT  5  s;, 
t  = 1,  T, 
where, in  the individual data T = 3 and Lo = $0, L1 = $500,  L2 = 
$1000, and L3 = $2000. In the family data T = 12. 40  Steven F. VentUDavid A. Wise 
Two-Limit Tobit 
When all  of the observations are used, there are T +  2  possible 
outcomes-contributions  at zero, contributions within each of  the  T 
closed intervals, and contributions at the upper limit. These outcomes 
and associated likelihoods  are 
(1)  (i>si  = 0,  @[TI; 
where @[.I  denotes the standard normal distribution function. 
One-Limit Tobit with Zeros Excluded 
When the zero values are excluded, there are T +  1 possible out- 
comes: the contribution lies within one of the T intervals or at the upper 
limit. These outcomes and associated likelihoods are 
t =  1,  T; 
The denominator in each expression, the probability of a positive con- 
tribution,  reflects the  fact that  noncontributors  have been  excluded 
from the analysis. In a single-equation model, the underlying distri- 
bution of contributions is truncated at zero when the one-limit Tobit 
specification is used, while there is a mass point at zero when the two- 
limit version is used. 
Simple Probit 
Finally, estimates can also be obtained with a simple probit speci- 
fication (up to the scale factor a).  In this case the outcomes and as- 
sociated likelihoods are 
(3) 41  The Determinants of IRA Contributions  and the Effect of Limit Changes 
Likelihood Function 
If  there are No observations at zero, Nt observations in interval t, 
and NT+I  observations at the upper limit, the log- likelihood function 
in each of the three cases is: 
It is clear that (B)  + (C) = (A) under the one-equation assumption. 
If this assumption is inconsistent with the data, the p estimated from 
(B) will differ from the p estimated from (C). In addition, to the extent 
that they differ, the sum of the likelihood values from (B) and (C) will 
be greater than the value from (A) since the “separated”  models allow 
a better fit to the data. Thus a test  of  the one-equation behavioral 
assumption can be based either on a comparison of the estimated  ps 
or on the likelihood values.  If  they  differ, a specification with  two 
behavioral equations may be indicated. 
2.  IRA Contributors and Contributions: A Two-Equation Model 
The purpose of this section is to describe a procedure that can be 
used to relax the one-equation constraint. It is assumed that two be- 
havioral relationships determine the contributions that we observe. One 
is a relationship between individual attributes and the likelihood that 
a person  is a potential IRA contributor. The other is a relationship 
between individual attributes and the level of desired contributions, 
were one to contribute. Of course, both of the outcome variables should 
be thought of initially as latent variables. In particular,  if  the latent 
contribution variable is less than zero, we shall assume that we observe 
no contribution, even if  the contributor latent variable is greater than 
zero. A desirable property of  the model is that it encompasses as a 42  Steven F.  VentVDavid A. Wise 
limiting case the standard Tobit model described in section  1 of  this 
appendix. 
The model is described by: 
C=xp+E, 
S=Xa+q, 
where C is the latent contribution variable and S the latent contributor 
variable, X  is a vector of  individual attributes, p and a  are vectors of 
parameters to be estimated, and E and q are disturbance terms.'* We 
assume that, given X, C and S obey the covariance matrix: 
L 
where p is the correlation between C and S, given X. 
The bivariate distribution between S and C is represented graphically 
in figure 1.3. The figure includes the limit on IRA contributions L. That 
is, as usual, we will not observe contributions above L but will observe 
a concentration  at  the level L. We  shall assume that a person  is a 
contributor if the latent contributor variable S is greater than zero, and 
if  the desired contribution amount is greater than zero. Thus when S 
and C are both greater than zero we observe IRA contributions greater 
than zero but less than or equal to L. 
As in the usual Tobit case, there are three observable outcomes: IRA 
contributions are zero, contributions are at some level C where C is 
Contributions 
Fig. 1.3  The bivariate distribution between S, the latent contributor 
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greater than zero but less than L,  or we observe C at the limit L. The 
likelihoods associated with these three outcomes are now 
Outcome  Likelihood 
c=o 
L,-l < C < L, 
c = LT 
Pr[S < 01  + Pr[S > 0 and C < 01 
Pr[S > 0 and L,-I < C < L,],  t  = 1, T 
Pr[S > 0 and C > L] 
They are described in  somewhat more detail by 
Outcome  Likelihood 
c=o  @[-Xa]  + @* [  xa,  -- -?  -P] 
CT 
c = LT 
where a*[.]  indicates the bivariate normal distribution function. 
If indeed C and S are the same underlying stochastic variable, as in 
the Tobit case, p goes to a  and p goes to 1.19 Thus in this case, the 
two-equation description of  IRA contributions  reduces to the Tobit 
specification. By  comparing the likelihood values in the two models, 
one can test explicitly whether the single behavioral equation version 
can be rejected. The difference between this test and those mentioned 
in section 1 of this appendix is that the two equations are allowed to 
be correlated. 
Appendix B 
U.S.  Data Sources 
All data for the United States are from the May 1983 Current Population 
Survey and Supplemental Survey of Pension and Retirement Plan Cov- 
erage. Two data sets were created: individual and family. 44  Steven E  VentVDavid A. Wise 
Individual Data 
all individuals meeting the following criteria: 





Included in the supplement (working for pay). 
Between the ages 16 and 65. 
Not self-employed. 
Containing valid responses for each of the variables used in table 
1.7. 
All summary tables and simulations (but not the estimated models) 
using individual data use the CPS weights designed to represent the 
nation as a whole. No adjustment to these weights was made for ex- 
clusion of observations due to invalid responses. 
Several problems arose with the way the IRA variables were coded. 
Employed persons were asked, “Do you have an IRA?”  Those an- 
swering in the affirmative were then asked, “Approximately how much 
of your own IRA did you credit to your 1982 Federal taxes?” Responses 
are coded in the intervals: 
under $100 




$1  000-$1999 
This categorization led to two problems.  First,  a  surprisingly  large 
number of persons reported IRA contributions in the first (under $100) 
category. Most of these responses probably indicate persons establish- 
ing IRAs prior to 1982 and making no contribution in 1982. We  have 
thus interpreted the first category to indicate zero contributions in 1982. 
Second, a small number of respondents (186) indicated a contribution 
exceeding $2500. These responses presumably reflect family rather than 
individual contributions. These observations have been deleted from 
our sample. 
Family Data 
For tax status the family is a more appropriate unit than the individual 
in the United States. Using relationship codes, ages, and marital status 
we have converted the CPS data to a family basis. The incidence of 
unclassifiable persons or otherwise inconsistent units was rather high. 
In such cases, the observations were deleted from the sample.20 One 
consequence of  this data conversion is that using the CPS weights is 
no longer appropriate. 45  The Determinants of IRA Contributions  and the Effect of Limit Changes 
There are two important advantages to forming a family-based sam- 
ple. The first is that the employment status of husband and wife in two- 
person families can be determined. This permits unambiguous assign- 
ment of contribution limits used to simulate policy changes. 
The second advantage is that marginal tax rates can be calculated 
based on the family information. Our calculations are based on U.S. 
Internal Revenue Service (1984). This source reports average adjust- 
ments and deductions by income category. The first step is to convert 
each family's reported total income to adjusted gross income by ac- 
counting for average  adjustments  (excluding  IRAs  and  Keoghs) by 
income class. To  obtain taxable income, personal exemptions ($1000 
each for self, spouse if married, and each child) and the average item- 
ized home mortgage interest deduction (in excess of  the standard de- 
duction if one were not to itemize) for families reporting owning a home 
are subtracted from gross income.  Finally,  1982 tax tables by filing 
status provide the marginal tax rates assigned to each family. These 
calculated rates span the entire range from zero to 50 percent. 
Appendix C 
Summary S  ta  t  is t  ics 
Variable 
Individual Data  Family Data 
Contributors  Contributors 
All  Only  All  Only 
Total Individual 
(Family) Income ($)  17403(12214) 
Agea (years)  37(12) 
Unmarried Women (%)  .17(.38) 
Unmarried Men (%)  .15(.36) 
Married Women (%)  .28(.45) 
Educationa (years)  13(2.7) 
Private Pensionb (%)  .5 1  (  .50) 
Salary Reduc. 
Planb (%)  .03(.  1  8) 
Marg. Tax Rate (%)  - 
26649( 16338) 


























"In the family data the value for this variable pertains to  the CPS reference person in 
the household. 
the family data the value for this variable is one of either member participates; zero 
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Notes 
1. In general, under the Canadian plan persons can contribute 20 percent of 
their income up to a maximum of $3500 for those with a private pension plan 
and up to $5500 for those without a private plan. 
2.  This may be contrasted with portfolio composition analysis most recently 
represented in the work by King and Leape (1984) or earlier work by Feldstein 
(1976), for example. 
3.  Given current income, contributions to tax-deferred accounts could  of 
course be taken partially or entirely from other existing asset balances.  The 
identification problem is to determine whether this is the case. It is not possible 
to address this issue with the CPS data, but it will be considered in subsequent 
analysis based on other data sources. 
4. As far as we know, a model like this one has not been estimated. In any 
event, data limitations and other choices in the empirical implementation would 
undoubtedly  leave uncertainty about the effect of tax-deferred  accounts, as 
well as the effect on tax-deferred contributions of changes in the contribution 
limits. 
5.  Answers to these questions are important in their own right and can be 
answered with considerable confidence. 
6. By referring back to figure 1.2, one can see the difference between these 
procedures. If all the data are used, then there is a concentration of observations 
at zero and at L. If the zero observations are deleted, there is no concentration 
of  data points at zero, but the distribution  is truncated at this point and the 
concentration at L remains. The third procedure only considers whether con- 
tributions are zero or not. 
7. The preference function that corresponds to equation (7) is 
V(Y -  S,S) = (S/p)e[o+@(Y-S)l’S, 
where n  = no + nlxl + ... upk + E, and p = Yb + q . 
8. The estimates are in fact negative, but not statistically different from zero. 
9. Given program limits, the estimated parameters, and values of X for each 
member of the sample, the expected contribution of each individual or family 
is (following the notation of appendix A): 
E(c) = Pr[C 5 01  . E[C  1  C 5 01 
+ Pr[O < C  < LI  . E[C  1  0 < C < Ll 
+ Pr[C 2 L] . E[C  I  C 2 Ll 
+ +(y)  - a(?)]  + [  1 - a(?)]  . L 
10. This estimate may be compared to the average IRA deduction based on 
IRS wage and salary returns which was $340 for 1982. 
11. This  lack  of  information  poses  a problem  for prediction  but  not  for 
estimation.  The statistical model used to obtain parameter estimates assigns 
all married persons an open-ended upper limit of $2000 or more. 
12. The implied correlation  between (q,Y  +  E,)  and (qsY +  E,)  is about 
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13.  It may be noticed that the sum of the individual likelihood functions is 
9490.5, whereas the likelihood  value for the joint specification is somewhat 
higher,  9497.8. The higher  likelihood  value  results from the equal variance 
restrictions on q  and the exclusion of education from the contribution equation. 
14. Indeed, for some years the estimated effect in Canada is in fact negative, 
although not statistically different from zero. 
15. Strictly speaking, the simulations indicate that had the Treasury proposal 
been implemented in  1982, contributions would have been 30 percent higher 
than they were. 
16. In principle,  the open intervals can be treated as closed intervals by 
setting limits of  --m  or -m.  We  treat open and closed intervals separately for 
expositional purposes only. 
17. To simplify matters this appendix derives likelihood functions for a linear 
specification of Si  and a homoscedastic error structure. The estimated model 
is based on the parameter and error structure given by equation (5) in the text. 
18. In practice, this model is also estimated with a nonlinear specification, 
with a heteroscedastic error structure, and with equations analogous to those 
in the text. 
19. First consider the C = 0 case. Under the limiting case, the probability 
of S greater than zero and C  less than zero goes to zero because this would 
be an outcome with zero likelihood. Thus, the bivariate distribution function 
drops out. The L,_l < C  < L, and C = LT  cases can be rewritten as Pr[S > 
OIL,-, < C < L,] . Pr[L,_I < c < L,] and  Pr[S > 0IC  > LT]  . Pr[C > &], 
respectively. The first term in each case goes to unity in the limiting case, since 
if C is greater than some positive L,, S must also be greater than zero. Thus 
in both cases the bivariate distribution in the last term of  likelihoods reduces 
to expressions containing only univariate cumulative distributions. 
20.  For example, we eliminated persons married but living in a single-person 
household.  Heads living with other relatives but not married were treated as 
single persons. 
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Comment  Gary Burtless 
Steven Venti and David Wise have written a very nice paper on the 
take-up of tax-preferred saving plans in the United States and Canada. 
The main objectives of the paper are stated at the outset: 
To analyze the effect of individual attributes on whether a person 
To  determine the effect of  individual attributes on how  much  is 
To  simulate the effect of  potential  changes in contribution limits 
In addition, the authors very briefly consider the more interesting 
issue of how much IRAs and similar plans contribute to net personal 
saving, taking into account the fact that IRA contributions may simply 
substitute for other forms of saving. 
The paper begins with a tabular presentation of some basic statistics 
on the take-up of IRAs in the United States and Registered Retirement 
Savings Plans (or RRSPs) in Canada. Both programs have a similar 
design. Wage earners are permitted to contribute designated amounts 
to qualified saving plans, and neither contributions nor the interest on 
contributions is subject to income tax until withdrawals begin during 
retirement. Under both the U.S. and Canadian plans, there is a max- 
imum permissible amount that workers can contribute to tax-preferred 
accounts in a given year. 
The authors’ tabulations show, not surprisingly, that the probability 
of workers contributing to a plan is strongly correlated with their in- 
come. In the United States the percentage of workers contributing to 
an IRA is about 5 percent in the lowest income class (under $10,000 
per year in  1982 earnings), but approaches 60  percent in the highest 
income class (earnings above $70,000). The percentages are quite sim- 
ilar in Canada, though there is evidence that Canadian taxpayers in the 
highest income class contribute somewhat less than taxpayers in  the 
upper-middle-income classes. Nor surprisingly, the average contribu- 
tion per worker-among  workers making a contribution-tends  to be 
closer to the permitted maximum in the higher income classes. 
How much of the strong correlation between contributions and in- 
come is due to an income effect and how much is due to a price effect 
is difficult to say. The price of retirement consumption (or, equivalently, 
the price of preretirement saving) can be dramatically reduced by an 
IRA. Because wage-earners temporarily escape income taxes on both 
the contribution out of current earnings and the interest on the con- 
contributes to IRAs; 
contributed; and 
on the amount contributed to IRAs. 
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tribution, they can essentially buy a greater level of retirement con- 
sumption from a $1 increase in current saving. However, the amount 
of the price change is determined by workers’ current and expected 
future income tax rates. The price reduction  is thus determined  by 
workers’marginal  tax  rates,  which  are in  turn  determined  by  their 
incomes. 
One odd aspect of these tabulations is the finding that workers in 
jobs covered by private pensions are more rather than less likely to 
contribute to IRAs than are uncovered workers, holding earnings levels 
constant.  Even when  the  authors use  a formal statistical  model  to 
control for the effects of other factors, they never find evidence that 
uncovered workers are any more likely to contribute to IRAs than are 
covered workers. Using family data, in fact, they find that uncovered 
workers are less likely to contribute to IRAs (see tables 1.7 and 1.10). 
Why this should be is difficult to explain; the authors do not attempt 
an explanation. Under a private pension plan the firm is saving on its 
workers’ behalf.  For at least a few of  its workers the firm must be 
“oversaving”  for their retirement. These workers would be expected 
to compensate for the oversaving by saving less outside of their pension 
plan. Hence, these workers should save less in the form of IRAs, which 
are in fact no more tax-preferred than are firms’ contributions to private 
pension plans. By contrast, uncovered workers have no employer which 
saves on their behalf. One would expect them to do their own saving 
for retirement, and IRAs are the cheapest way  for them  to do so. 
Conceivably, workers with  strong preferences  for retirement saving 
sort themselves into pension-covered jobs. Their demand for retire- 
ment income is not satisfied by their employers’ saving in pension plans, 
so they salt away additional savings in IRAs. This explanation, while 
somewhat plausible, is nonetheless surprising. 
In the following section, Wise and  Venti consider  the estimation 
problem confronting them. Their discussion of the statistical issues is 
a model of lucidity. Essentially, there are three issues to be dealt with: 
How to model the decision to contribute to an IRA; 
How to estimate the demand function for contributions, given that 
How to deal with the limits on contributions set by current law. 
Although the authors discuss three or four solutions,  and in  fact 
estimate the IRA demand function using more than one of them, the 
doubly-truncated Tobit model seems to perform about as well as more 
elaborate alternatives. That is, the more elaborate alternatives do not 
yield meaningfully different estimates of participation rates in IRAs, 
demand for IRAs, or the number of persons at the maximum contri- 
bution level. 
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For those not familiar with the Tobit model, the idea is very simple. 
For any particular individual, an index of the desire to make contri- 
butions to an IRA can extend over the entire range of real numbers- 
including negative numbers (for workers wishing to reduce their IRA 
holdings) and high positive numbers (for workers wishing to contribute 
an amount in excess of the legal maximum). However, there is an upper 
and lower bound  on the observed  distribution of  demands  because 
workers are prevented from reporting withdrawals  and are not per- 
mitted  to make  contributions in  excess of  the maximum. Assuming 
normality in the distribution of the error terms, it is straightforward to 
obtain maximum likelihood estimates of  the parameters that predict 
both the desired and the observed demand for IRA contributions. The 
model here is somewhat more clever than the usual Tobit model because 
it properly treats the issue of heteroscedasticity. 
Venti and Wise obtain maximum likelihood estimates for both U.S. 
and Canadian workers. The U.S. data are examined in two different 
ways. The authors consider individual-level data on contributions and 
then look at family-level data. The main difference between the two 
statistical specifications is that the marginal tax rate is excluded as an 
explanatory variable when the authors estimate individuals’ demand 
for IRAs.  I  have no idea why  this critical variable is excluded for 
individuals.  As mentioned  earlier,  the marginal tax  rate is the main 
determinant of the marginal price of retirement saving in terms of cur- 
rent consumption foregone. To  estimate a demand function that in- 
cludes only income but excludes price seems odd, but I presume this 
was motivated  by some defect in  the data set. It seems clear to me 
that the marginal tax rate is as well defined for an individual in a joint 
filing unit as it is for the full filing unit. (In fact, it may be better defined 
if two members face differing tax rates on marginal earnings, as they 
sometimes will.) 
The estimates for both the United States and Canada appear plau- 
sible. In the United States, the results indicate an elasticity of contri- 
butions  with respect to income of 0.63-which  doesn’t seem unrea- 
sonable to me. But this estimate is subject to the qualification that it 
may be capturing some of the effect of varying the price of  IRA con- 
tributions.  As  I mentioned  above, income and price  will  be highly 
correlated under a progressive income tax scheme. In the individual- 
level specification, Venti and Wise exclude the price (or its proxy- 
MTR), implying that much of the effect of the price variation must be 
captured by the income term. In the family-level specification, the price 
term is included, but is so highly correlated with income (and possibly 
mismeasured because of the imputation procedure) that its coefficient 
must be at least a bit  suspect. I  think  this has implications  for the 
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Essentially,  we  have two variables-income  and the price  of  sav- 
ing-which  are highly  correlated.  Both  variables probably  have  an 
important and independent effect on the demand for and attractiveness 
of  IRA  savings. The statistical procedure  must  somehow divide up 
the explanation of  overall variance into a part explained by income 
and a part explained by  price. Since the two variables are so highly 
correlated, this may be difficult to do. The highly erratic estimates of 
the effect of MTR  are apparent in tables  1.9 and  1.10. I’m not  sure 
we  can trust those estimates, and for that reason,  I’m  not  sure the 
simulations (especially those for the new Treasury tax plan) are en- 
tirely trustworthy. 
The authors,  however,  are extremely  careful to show the corre- 
spondence between their findings (1) using different models; (2) for the 
United States and Canada; and (3) from cross-sectional and time-series 
analysis of Canadian data. Those comparisons add considerably to the 
believability of the results. 
The simulations in the paper show the effect of raising the present 
limits on IRA contributions.  Since limit changes are frequently pro- 
posed, I think the results are interesting. Although I know little about 
past IRA research or simulations, these simulation predictions seem 
quite reasonable. 
In closing, I wish to consider whether the questions dealt with in the 
simulations lie at the heart of the IRA issue. The critical question about 
IRAs and other tax-preferred saving plans is whether they contribute 
to or subtract from net personal saving. Because they reduce the price 
of saving for retirement, many Congressmen blithely assume that IRAs 
must eventually raise the amount of private saving that is done. The 
more sophisticated members of Congress would agree that in the short 
run most of the contributions to IRAs may come out of non-tax-sheltered 
savings. But in the long run-so  the argument goes-workers  will salt 
away something extra because retirement saving is so cheap. 
As economists we cannot be so sanguine. The issue is deeper than 
the average Congressman imagines.  If  the price  of  obtaining  $1  of 
consumption during retirement is reduced by enough, workers may 
actually engage in less not more saving for retirement; less saving is 
needed to attain a target level of retirement consumption. In fact, if 
everyone contributes at the maximum level, the marginal price of saving 
has not even been reduced. The net effect of IRAs on personal saving 
is the critical issue economists must address. This paper briefly raises 
the subject, but because of data limitations is prevented from formally 
addressing it. What would be useful here is a clear exposition of this 
main issue and an explanation of  how  the results  in this paper+r 
extensions of  those  results-contribute to our understanding  of  the 
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This paper, however, generally ignores the issue of the price of re- 
tirement saving (or retirement consumption, however you wish to view 
it). It ignores the objectives of retirement saving both from the point 
of view of the individual utility maximizer and the typical member of 
Congress.' And it does not treat the problem of saving in the relevant 
framework of  lifetime utility  maximization  within  a lifetime budget 
constraint that is affected by nonlinear taxes. 
Can this paper tell us anything about the fundamental question just 
mentioned? I think it can. If we look over the tabular results, we notice 
that only a small minority of wage earners are at or near the maximum 
contribution level for IRAs or Canadian RRSPs. Even at the highest 
income (and marginal tax rate) levels, only a bare majority of U.S. and 
Canadian men make contributions equal to the legal maximum. This 
implies that the marginal price (not just the average price) of retirement 
saving has unambiguously been reduced for virtually all wage earners. 
The IRA does not represent a windfall drop in taxes which has no net 
effect on the marginal price of  saving. In the case of the United States, 
the reduction in marginal price was sharp and discontinuous. If  IRAs 
on balance encourage retirement saving, by reducing its marginal price, 
we should see some immediate population response, discernible in the 
aggregate statistics on personal saving. In fact, however, the U.S. per- 
sonal saving rate has fallen precipitously since 1982, when IRAs were 
first extended to all wage earners, and in  1986 stood at 3.9 percent- 
less than half the rate of the 1970~.~  The net impact of IRAs on personal 
saving, if any, has evidently been small or swamped by other factors. 
In sum, I like the empirical work very much, and 1 admire the ex- 
position and statistical modeling. But I would be interested in learning 
the authors' views on the relative importance of the issues raised and 
formally treated in this paper. Without treating the question of the net 
impact of  IRAs on personal saving can any research on IRAs hold 
broad interest for economists? I realize that the U.S. and Canadian tax 
authorities will be very interested in these findings. But will the findings 
interest most public finance economists? 
1. If the goal of a typical Congressman is to raise the net national saving rate, IRAs 
are an even poorer instrument than suggested in the previous paragraph. Even if an IRA 
succeeds in raising the private saving rate, it will reduce the public saving rate, at least 
initially, because it must reduce government tax revenue. Unless the net private saving 
response is fairly substantial,  the loss in  government saving can easily exceed the rise 
in private saving, leading to  a reduction in net national saving. 
2.  U.S. Council  of Economic  Advisors,  Economic Report  of  the  President,  1987, 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office) 1987, p. 274. 